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The bottom up pressure of "concerned" consumers and the rise of "socially 
responsible" products represents a new market mechanism to fight inequality 
and promote social inclusion. To analyze the new phenomenon of 
competition in corporate social responsibility (CSR) amid doubts on consumer 
tastes and of the effective corporate SR stance we adopt a horizontal 
differentiation approach in which the Hotelling segment is reinterpreted as the 
space of product SR characteristics and consumer tastes are uncertain. We 
find equilibria of the pure location and of the price-location games and show 
what changes when we move from a duopoly of profit maximizing producers 
to a mixed duopoly. Our findings illustrate that a nonzero degree of CSR is 
the optimal choice of profit maximizing corporations under reasonable 
parametric intervals of consumers’ "costs of ethical distance", corporate cost 
of CSR and uncertainty about consumer tastes. 
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The traditional scheme of welfare economics problems of negative externalities
generated by the productive units, inequality of opportunities and underpro-
vision of public goods where tackled by the action of "enlightened" domestic
institutions. In this old model a system of checks and balances among cor-
porations, domestic institutions and trade unions ensured the joint pursuit of
economic development and social cohesion, thereby avoiding socially disruptive
levels of inequality. The global integration of labour and product markets has
signiﬁcantly weakened the bargaining power of domestic institutions and trade
unions. Corporation can now operate globally with the risk of generating a "race
to the bottom" among domestic ﬁscal authorities and workers representatives in
order to attract job opportunities and direct investment. In this perspective the
rise of bottom-up pressure of "concerned" consumers and investors may there-
fore be seen as a sort of endogenous reaction of the socioeconomic system facing
the excess bargaining power of global corporations: consumers and investors
1vote with their portfolio by looking not just at price and quality, but also at the
social value incorporated in the products. Corporate social responsibility (CSR)
is an increasingly debated issue in contemporary market economies.3 KPMG
(2005) reports that, in the year 2005, 52 percent of the top 100 corporations in
the 16 more industrialized countries published a CSR report. In a recent sur-
vey the "2003 Corporate social responsibility monitor"4 ﬁnds that the amount
of consumers looking at social responsibility in their choices jumped from 36
percent in 1999 to 62 percent in 2001 in Europe.
A simple way of modeling this novel feature of the economic environment
is within diﬀerentiation models5 by reinterpreting the space of product charac-
teristics as the space of both ﬁrm CSR behavior and heterogeneous consumers’
CSR beliefs. On the corporate side, since CSR is not a "free lunch" and implies a
shift of focus from the maximization of shareholder wealth to the maximization
of the interest of a wider set of stakeholders, we can model it as the payment of
a variable premium over input costs.
This generalization may include various cases of compensation to stakehold-
ers diﬀerent from shareholders such as eﬃciency wages (Shapiro-Stiglitz, 1984),
other types of monetary and non monetary beneﬁts for workers, the adoption
of environmental friendly but more costly productive processes, the introduc-
tion of code of conducts on labour conditions in subcontracting companies, etc.
Within this framework we are interested to evaluate whether ﬁrms may ﬁnd it
optimal to choose CSR, even when it is modelled as a pure cost.6 To do so we
investigate three speciﬁc problems: i) the optimal location choices in a duopoly
in which ﬁrms maximize proﬁts under uncertainty of consumer tastes; ii) the
price-location equilibrium of the problem in i); iii) the price-location equilibrium
in a mixed duopoly in which a proﬁt maximizing producer competes with a non
proﬁt organization.
The original contribution of our model consists of the introduction in the
classical product diﬀerentiation literature of the novel feature of CSR com-
petition under consumer taste uncertainty. The introduction of uncertainty
acknowledges that one of the main problems in CSR is that of asymmetric in-
3For a reference on the most relevant positions in the historical debate evaluating causes and
consequences of CSR see Friedman (1962) and Freeman (1984), while on the methodological
problems arising when pursuing the goal of maximization of multiple stakeholders interests
see Jensen (1986) and Tirole (2001).
4Downloadable at http://www.bsdglobal.com/issues/sr.asp.
5For a reference to the traditional literature on horizontal product diﬀerentiation see
Hotelling, (1929); D’Aspremont, Gabsewicz and Thisse (1979); Economides (1984); Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986), while for vertical diﬀerentiation the seminal paper is Shaked-Sutton (1983).
In a synthesis of the two perspectives Craemer and Thisse (1991) show that location horizontal
diﬀerentiation models can be considered as special cases of vertical diﬀerentiation models.
6As it is well known CSR costs may be compensated by potential beneﬁts (beyond the
increased demand of concerned consumers) such as the minimisation of conﬂicts of interest
with stakeholders (Freeman, 1984), an improved signal on product quality in a framework
of asymmetric information, increased workers motivation (Frey, 1997), etc. In spite of these
potential beneﬁts, CSR is likely to generate a reduction of corporate proﬁts and therefore
a model in which it is considered as a pure cost (compensated by the increased demand of
concerned consumers)has sound foundation.
2formation. The latter is relevant in two respects. On the one side, consumers
can not observe the true CSR stance of producers and have to rely on their dec-
laration, or on the signal produced by various product certiﬁcation entities. On
the other side, producers may not know exactly consumers ethical tastes. Both
ingredients create an inevitable element of uncertainty which renders impossible
to evaluate with precision the eﬀect of CSR on producer market shares. Given
our hypotheses, the closer reference in the literature to our model is that of
De Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou and Thisse (1985), who calculate optimal
location in a simple location horizontal diﬀerentiation model à la Hotelling in
presence of uncertainty about consumer tastes.
With respect to this paper (a part for the economic motivation and the rele-
vance of the new phenomenon of CSR explained above) our approach represents
an original contribution also on a purely analytical point of view. Consider in
fact that, in our case, location has consequences on (CSR) costs (moving right-
ward is costly for producers as it implies paying higher SR costs) and therefore
we may conceive the Hotelling segment of the CSR product diﬀerentiation model
as "upward sloped" for producers.
The paper is divided into ﬁve sections (introduction and conclusion in-
cluded). In the second section we shortly describe model characteristics. In the
third section we outline the pure location equilibrium. In the fourth the price-
location equilibrium, while in the ﬁfth section we examine departures from the
latter when we move from a duopoly to a mixed oligopoly.
2 The model
In our "CSR product diﬀerentiation" model the two producers locate on the
point (x ∈[0,1]) of the market segment according to their degree of SR. On
the right boundary of the SR space the duopolists pay the maximum amount
of SR costs s, with non SR costs being set to zero - as in De Palma et al.
(1985) - without lack of generality. Hence, as far as producers move rightward,
they become more SR and pay a higher x-portion of the maximum cost s.T h e
p r o d u c ti ss o l da tag i v e np r i c ep. Consumers have inelastic unit demands and
are uniformly distributed along the [0,1] interval of the SR space X.C o n s u m e r
locations are denoted by x ∈ X and measured as distances from the origin of
the segment. More speciﬁcally, we formulate the utility function of a consumer
3located in x and purchasing from ﬁrm i as follows:7
vi[x]=b − p − f |x − xi| (1)
where b is the consumer’s reservation value of the product when his ethical
standards coincide with those incorporated in the product and f is the weight
given to the disutility of consuming a product whose ethical standards are below
one’s own standards.8
Firms can not predict consumers’ behavior ap r i o r i , but they can determine
the utility of a consumer located in x up to a probability distribution:
ui[x]=vi[x]+µεi (2)
where εi is a random variable with zero mean and unit variance and µ is a
positive constant. Heterogeneity in consumer tastes is indicated by µ, which
gives diﬀerent weight to the unknown terms of the probabilistic utility function.
The higher is µ, the larger is the stochastic term of the utility function. Diﬀer-
ently from De Palma et al. (1985), in our model uncertainty concerns consumer
ethical beliefs which can not be observed with precision by producers.
2.1 The location model
In this ﬁrst simpliﬁed version of the model we assume that two proﬁt maximizing
producers have unit prices and compete in the market, with location being their
only choice variable.
Following De Palma et al. (1985) and Manski et al. (1981), we assume
that the terms εi are identically, independently Weibull-distributed, so that the







7Empirical support for our hypothesis on the heterogeneity of individual attitudes toward
social responsibility (implied by the symmetric cost of SR distance) is conﬁrmed by descriptive
evidence from the World Value Survey database - 65,660 (15,443) individuals interviewed
between 1980 and 1990 (1990 and 2000) in representative samples of 30 (7) diﬀerent countries-.
In both surveys around 45 (49) percent of sample respondents declare that they are not willing
t op a yi ne x c e s sf o rt h ee n v i r o n m e n t a l l yr e s p o n s i b l ef e a t u r e so fap r o d u c t .T h es a m es u r v e y
documents that the share of those arguing that the poor are to be blamed is around 29
percent in both surveys. This simple evidence conﬁrms heterogeneity in the willingness to
pay for social and environmental responsibility, rejecting the assumption that more of SR
may be better for all individuals.
8The cost of ethical distance has a clear monetary counterpart. When the producer is
located at the left of the consumer this cost represents the distance in monetary terms between
the CSR engagement (measured by the CSR cost in our model), which is considered fair by
the consumer (indicated by his location on the segment) and the CSR cost suﬀered by the
producer (indicated by producer’s location on the segment). The coeﬃcient t maps this
objective measure into consumers preferences indicating whether its impact on consumers
utility is proportional (t=1), more than proportional (t>1) or less than proportional (t<1)
than its amount in monetary terms.
4When both producers choose their locations, we identify three regions on the
ethical segment (the ﬁrst at the left of the less ethical producer, the second in
between the two producer locations and the third at the right of the more ethical
producer). We therefore deﬁne the probability of purchasing from producer 1













where δ = |x1 − x2|,H=e x p ( −fδ/µ) and K =e x p ( fδ/µ). So the ﬁrst and
the last probabilities are invariant in x, while the second is decreasing in x since
∂P2
1
∂x < 0. By evaluating the second derivative we can ﬁnd the inﬂexion point
x = x1 + δ
2.
For x1 <x<x 1+ δ
2 the probability function is concave and, for x1+ δ
2 <x<
x2, it is convex, its shape depending also on the amount of µ.The higher is µ,
the ﬂatter is the function as it is shown in ﬁgure 1 (µ2 >µ 1). The ﬁgure clearly
shows that a higher weight on the stochastic term has the eﬀect of reducing
"location rents" of the two producers.
Let us deﬁne as Agglomerated Nash Equilibrium (ANE) a Nash equilibrium
in which both locations coincide. By using this deﬁnition we can formulate the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: A location maximization problem of two competing producers
in a market with ethical consumers has a unique Agglomerated Nash Location





Given assumptions 1 and 2, and letting p =1 , we can evaluate the proﬁto f
























5Figure 2.1.1. Legend: on the horizontal axis we measure the market segment in
which the two producer locations x1 and x2 delimit three consumer regions. On the
vertical axis we measure the probability that the consumer located in the corresponding
p o i n to ft h em a r k e ts e g m e n tb u y sf r o mﬁrm 1.
We can consider s as a parameter which deﬁnes, in the context of ﬁgure
2.1.1, the rectangle of ethical costs. The problem can be solved by considering
x2 >x 1 and, symmetrically, the same results can be obtained when x2 <x 1.
To analyze the best location reply (BLR) of ﬁrm 1 given the location of ﬁrm 2




µ(K − H)+2 f(1 − x1 − x2)
2µ(1 + K)(1 + H)
− s =0 (6)




µ(H − K)+2 f(1 − x1 − x2)
2µ(1 + K)(1 + H)
− s =0 (7)
As the two functions are symmetric, they intersect on the line x1 = x2 = x∗.
Thus it is easy to show that the Nash equilibrium of the game is given by the








The solution in (8) can be a Nash equilibrium if it is positive, or if the




The second order conditions are respected, since the second derivatives, eval-
uated in x =1 /2 − 2µs/f, are always negative:9
d2π1
dx1






−2f [K(1 − s)+H(1 + s)+2 ]
µ(1 + K)2(1 + H)2 < 0. (9)
d2π2
dx2






−2f [K(1 + s)+H(1 − s)+2 ]
µ(1 + K)2(1 + H)2 < 0.¤ (10)
The interpretation of our proposition is that proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms will
choose CSR if the ratio between consumer sensitiveness to CSR and uncertainty
on the heterogeneity of consumer tastes is above a given threshold.
To compare our results with the standard one of Hotelling (1929) consider
that the minimum diﬀerentiation principle applies also here but it is quite ev-
ident that the optimal location of the two producers is shifted to the left with
respect to the standard case without SR, when they locate in 1
2. This is because
the duopolists ﬁnd their Nash equilibrium choosing the same location but their
segment is "upward sloping" since they feel the increasing eﬀects of the ethical
c o s t sa sf a ra st h e ym o v et ot h er i g h t .
As expected, the optimal location depends positively on the consumer sensi-
tiveness to CSR (f) and negatively from the precision with which the producer
may identify consumer CSR tastes (measured by the µ parameter). Finally, the
optimal location obviously depends from the "inclination of the slope", or from
the amount of transfers s: the higher is s, the more expensive is locating on the
right of the segment.
We provide a parametric example of the Agglomerated Nash Equilibrium in
Figure 2 eq. (6) and eq. (7) when f =1 ,s=0 .25 and µ =0 .5. The two reaction
functions are symmetric and intersect on the diagonal in the point (0.25;0.25),




{2fµ[−K − H − 2](1 + K)(1 + H)−
−2[−fK(1 + H)+fH(1 + K)][µ(K − H)+
+2f(1−x1−x2)/4µ2(1+K)2(1+H)2. Since the denominator is always positive we consider
the numerator, which is
©










2fµ[−K − H − 2](1 + K)(1 + H)−
−2f [K(1 + H) − H(1 + K)][µ(H − K)+
+2f(1 − x1 − x2)] =
=
©
−8fµ(K + H +2 )+4 f2(1 − x1 − x2)(H − K)
ª




have the expression in (10).
7Figure 2.1.2
A graphical inspection of the solution (8) is provided in ﬁgure 2.1.2 where it is
shown that, for a given level of s and f, the optimal CSR location in equilibrium
depends from the degree of uncertainty on consumer tastes. If uncertainty is
very high the two competitors ﬁnd it optimal not to pay the cost of CSR even
for low levels of s .
We also observe that s inﬂuences producers’ location in proportion to µ:t h e
larger the uncertainty about consumer tastes and reaction to CSR, the higher
the risks related to the CSR cost paid and the lower the CSR stance chosen
in equilibrium. A higher f reinforces this eﬀect, as it is shown in Figure 2.1.4,
thereby making (coeteris paribus) equilibrium loci less step. This is because, if
the ethical concern of consumers increase, producers choose to be more ethical
independent of s.
On the contrary, when µ is high, s is crucial in the decision of x∗, because
consumers are more heterogeneous and so distributed along the whole segment
and this eﬀect is reinforced when f is lower, as shown in Figure 2.1.5, because
ﬁrms can give less importance to consumers ethical opportunity costs.
8Figure 2.1.3. f =1
Figure 2.1.4. f =2
9Figure 2.1.5.f =0 .5
2.2 The price model
In this section we want to investigate what happens in our model when the two
producers have ﬁxed location and compete in prices. The analysis of the model
under these assumptions may be considered unrealistic, but is a preliminary tool
necessary, as we will see in the following section, to illustrate the equilibrium
when the two producers compete in both location and prices.10
The model under the above described characteristics leads us to formulate
the following proposition.
Proposition 2: In a market with SR concerned consumers a price maximiza-
t i o np r o b l e mo ft w oc o m p e t i n gP M P sh a sau n i q u eA g g l o m e r a t e dN a s hP r i c e
Equilibrium given by p1 = p2 =2 µ.
Proof:
Since producer locations coincide we do not have three regions anymore.
Thus, the probability that a consumer located in x will buy from ﬁrm i will be
simply:
10The stronger justiﬁcation for the price model is that the two producers may decide to
collude. In this case their optimal choice may be zero (or a minimal common level of) CSR and
a common price policy with a commitment to avoid price undercutting strategies à la Bertrand.
All other rationales for an exogenous level of CSR (prohibitive costs of implementation of CSR
standards in some speciﬁc industries or discontinuities in the choice of the CSR cost which
prevent ﬁrms to move from a unique discrete choice) may also contribute to justify the price





































This means that the two price reaction functions dπ1
dp1 (·) and dπ2
dp2 (·) are sym-
metric in the p1,p 2 plan with respect to the bisector, so they cross on the bisector
itself, as shown in Figure 2.2.1. For this reason we can easily ﬁnd a unique price
Nash equilibrium p1 = p2 = p:
2µ − p =0⇒ p =2 µ
11We check second order conditions by evaluating the second derivative for













Substituting p1 =2 µ we have
dπ1
dp1
















To interpret the equilibrium of the model consider that, in the price model,
a reduction in the capacity to identify consumer CSR tastes leads to an increase
in prices when ﬁrms are located in the same point of the interval. The inter-
pretation is that consequences of the magniﬁcation of the random component
in the consumer utility function are asymmetric. More speciﬁcally, a higher µ
implies that consumers may accept to buy at higher price, while the negative
consequences of higher prices for the producer, as far as µ grows, are bounded.
In other words, the marginal beneﬁt of a price rise for a producer is always
positive as far as µ grows, while, on the other direction, the consumer may sim-
ply decide not to buy the product without determining increasing losses to the
producer as far as µ grows.
2.3 The location-price model
In this section we analyze the model under the assumption that producers com-
pete by choosing both CSR location and prices. Thus, producer 1 will face
















µ . Again, the ﬁrst and the last probabilities are constant,




Within this framework it is possible to formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 3: In a location-price maximization problem of two competing






, there is an Agglomerated Nash Equilibrium given by x1 =
x2 = 1
2 − s
f and p1 = p2 =2 µ.
12Proof:


































































The optimal choice for ﬁrm 1 is given by evaluating ﬁrst order conditions








(1 + eλH)2 +
(1 − x2)(1 + eλK(1 − p1/µ))































K(1 + eλH)+H(1 + eλK)

















(1 + e−λK)2 +




























H(1 + e−λK)+K(1 + e−λH)














If an agglomerated Nash equilibrium exists, the following equality x1 = x2 =
x should hold in it. Hence, as a ﬁrst step, we can easily turn back to the price
problem where we ﬁxed both locations and found solutions for prices. As a
second step, we may use the price problem result (p1 = p2 =2 µ = p) in eq.
(20) to ﬁnd an agglomerated location solution (x1 = x2 = x). The common
location has to verify the necessary condition to be a Nash equilibrium, given
























and we can easily verify that the last solution x satisﬁes also ﬁrst order
conditions of ﬁrm 2.
The suﬃcient condition is given by the Hessian matrix of the problem for
ﬁrm 1 and for ﬁrm 2 evaluated at x0:














This means that solution (24) is a Nash equilibrium if f>s2
2µ holds. By
combining this condition with the one which ensures a positive solution (f>2s),






Remark: Proposition 3 ensures that an ANE exists, but we don’t know if it
is the unique Nash equilibrium of the problem.
This result can be obtained also by considering this problem as a location
problem with price p 6=1 . Just by multiplying the ﬁr s tt e r mi ne q .( 6 )a n di n
eq. (7) by 2µ, we have the same result as in (24).
A computation using particular values of parameters can help us to see if that
agglomerated equilibrium is unique. In particular, when µ =1and f =1 , we
14can easily verify that, after a few steps, all variables converge to their theoretical
value, as shown in Table 2.3.1.
In Table 2.3.1 we have two diﬀerent sets of initial parameters. In the ﬁrst
one s =0 .25; starting by all variables null, we suppose that the two competitors
maximize their proﬁts observing values of each other variables. In this case ﬁrm
1 maximizes ﬁrst triggering ﬁrm 2 optimal reaction and so on. After 9 steps all
values stabilize and reach solutions (x0,p). In the second scenario s =0 .45 and,
proceeding in the same way, variables converge after 12 steps to the solution
(x0,p).
Table 2.3.1
If we compare the optimal level of CSR in the location and in the price-
location game we ﬁnd that CSR is higher in the latter. More speciﬁcally, the
parameters s and f inﬂuence the optimal location choice as in the pure location
model, but this time the result does not depend on the uncertainty on consumer
tastes. This is because, with the price variable, producers may get also beneﬁts
from uncertainty on consumer tastes since they may loose some customers but
also pick up some others with high reservation price. The opportunity to use
15prices together with location allows them to choose relatively more CSR than
in the pure location model for a given level of uncertainty on consumer tastes.
3 F a i rT r a d e re n t r y
In many cases CSR competition originates from the market entry of a SR, non
proﬁt maximizing, "pioneer" with reaction of the incumbent proﬁt maximizing
producer through partial CSR imitation. To check whether the presence of the
pioneer has some relevance with respect to a duopoly of two proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrms we ﬁnd it useful to analyze what happens in terms of CSR when we move
from our previous model to a mixed oligopoly in which one of the two producers
is proﬁt maximizing and the other is not.
A typical example of a zero proﬁt producer may be that of the Fair Trader
(FT).11 His ethical stance consists of transferring the whole proﬁtt ot h es u b c o n -
tractee. As a consequence his proﬁt will be zero and his maximization problem
concerns transfers instead of proﬁt s .T h u st h eF Th a st oc h o o s eal o c a t i o ni nt h e
ethical segment by maximizing total transfers T.This last is given by the sum


















We are going to investigate what happens on player 2 if player 1 becomes
"closer" to a FT, or if it decides to maximize CSR costs (transfers). We will
study the behavior of variables around the initial optimal solution (x0,p) found
in the two PMP case. We have the following proposition.
Intuitively, becoming a FT, the ﬁrm will move to the right in the ethical
segment. This happens because the function of transfers grows when location
11Fair traders compete with traditional producers and distributors by selling food and textile
products which incorporate social and environmentally responsible characteristics and have
to goal of fostering inclusion of marginalised producers in the South. The 2005 European Fair
Trade Report illustrates that fair trade sales have grown by 20 percent per year in the last
ﬁve years and have reached signiﬁcant market share in some speciﬁc segments (i.e. 49 percent
of bananas in Switzerland and 20 percent of ground coﬀee in the UK). After fair traders’
entry on the market large transnationals have partially imitated them by introducing similar
products in their product range. According to BBC news, on October the 7th, 2000 Nestle has
launched a fair trade instant coﬀee as it looks to tap into growing demand among consumers.
The BBC comments the news saying that "Ethical shopping is an increasing trend in the UK,
as consumers pay more to ensure poor farmers get a better deal." and reports the comment of
Fiona Kendrick, Nestle’s UK head of beverages arguing that "Speciﬁcally in terms of coﬀee,
fair trade is 3 percent of the instant market and has been growing at good double-digit
growth and continues to grow." One of the world’s biggest players in the coﬀee market, the
US consumer good company Procter & Gamble, announced it would begin oﬀering Fair Trade
certiﬁed coﬀee through one of its specialty brands. Following Procter & Gamble’s decision
to start selling a Fair Trade coﬀee, also Kraft Foods, another coﬀee giant, committed itself
to purchasing sustainably grown coﬀee. On the theoretical debate of the role and impact of
Fair Trade at micro and aggregate level see also Becchetti and Solferino (2004), Hayes (2004),
Leclair (2002) and Moore (2004).
16x2 increases from the initial point, as its derivative with respect to x2 evaluated




























, and two competing PMPs maximizing their proﬁti n
the location in x0 = 1
2 − s
f, if ﬁrm 2 moves slightly to the right on the ethical
segment, there will be a small reduction of location and price of ﬁrm 1.
Proof:
To analyze the eﬀects of this increase in x2 with the second producer moving
from the initial point to the right, we consider the ﬁrst order conditions with






(1 + eλH)2 +
(1 − x2)(1 + eλK(1 − p1/µ))
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+
(1 − x2)(1 + e−λH(1 − p2/µ))












(1 + e−λK)(1 + e−λH)
¾
=0
As these derivatives are null in the initial point (optimum for the two PMP
case), we can apply the Implicit Function Theorem and evaluate the eﬀects of
variables with respect to each other in that point. So we have
17∂x1
∂p1
















































































































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
x0,p
= s; (27)
As we can see a higher x2 generates a price change (p1 decreases and p2
increases). A reduction of p1 makes x1 decrease too and so prices change again.
If we organize this process in sequential steps, given the FT decision to move
x2 slightly to the right (∆x1 = h)w ec a nd e ﬁne as ai,b i and ci respectively
∆x1,∆p1 and ∆p2 in the step i. Hence we have




b1,b 2 = sa1 +
1
2








bn−1,b n = san−1 +
1
2



























18If F has 3 distinct real eigenvalues then every solution yn of the system
of linear diﬀerence equation (30) tends to 0 as n →∞if and only if all the
eigenvalues of F have absolute value less than 1.
In fact the eigenvalues solve
det(λI − F)=0 (32)
they are λ1 = 1










fµ ,w h i c h
are real distinct and |λi| < 1,i=1 ,...,3.














We add y1to both sides and can rearrange it as
yN +( I − F)
N−1 X
n=1
yn = y1 (34)
and
(I − F)−1yN +
N−1 X
n=1
yn =( I − F)−1y1 (35)










therefore we can evaluate (I − F) and we can write
∞ X
n=1


























The ﬁnal increments around the point (x0,p) are
19∞ X
n=1










cn = ∆p2 =
2fµsh
3fµ− s2 (40)
Hence, after a small variation of x2 to the right, the PMP moves slightly
to the left, reducing his price and so conquering a greater market share of less
ethical consumers. The FT increases his price to cover the added costs due to
ethicity (sx2).¤
Tabel 3.1
However, when facing greater variation of x2, the PMP decides to move to
the right as well and increases his price. For example recalling the scenarios
described in the previous section, we suppose that the FT decides to locate in
20x2 =1from the initial point (x0,p). The reaction of the PMP from the initial
point (x0,p) is indicated in Table 3.1.
As we can see this time the PMP has to move to the right, otherwise he would
lose his market share. To cover the higher costs of CSR he has to increase his
price too.
The tables show that when a ﬁrm become a FT locating at the right extreme
of the segment, even the other ﬁrm become more ethical and moves to the right.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The last decade witnessed a signiﬁcant expansion of CSR practices of the most
important corporations, with many of them advertising their advances in this
ﬁeld in order to conquer the increasing share of "concerned" consumers. CSR,
as many other aspects of economic reality, suﬀers from the typical problem of
asymmetric information. Many consumers wonder whether ethical ﬁrms really
do what they advertise, while the same ﬁrms try to understand whether con-
sumers will give weight to CSR in their demand functions and/or believe to their
declared CSR stance. For these reasons we argue that a product diﬀerentiation
model in which the traditional Hotelling segment is reinterpreted as the space
of CSR product characteristics in presence of uncertainty on consumer tastes is
the best candidate to analyze this emerging form of competition.
What we learn within this theoretical framework is that the minimum diﬀer-
entiation principle, the standard result in location games without uncertainty,
applies also here except that location is not in the middle of the segment but
shifted to the left. The rationale is that moving to the right (becoming more
SR) entails costs for producers which may be recovered only if consumer have
suﬃciently strong preferences for CSR. The higher these costs and the higher
the uncertainty on consumer preferences, the more diﬃcult it is that produc-
ers will choose a nonzero level of CSR. More interestingly, we ﬁnd that also the
price-location model has an agglomerated Nash equilibrium when consumer pref-
erences for CSR are suﬃciently high. CSR will be higher in the price-location
than in the pure location game since producers may remunerate with higher
prices their CSR stance. A ﬁnal result of the model is that when we move from
the duopoly of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms to a mixed oligopoly in which one of
the two behaves as a "social market enterprise" (as fair trade producers do) the
level of CSR of his competitor becomes also higher. This ﬁnal result is consistent
with the history of CSR competition among fair traders and big transnationals
which started imitating the former by introducing fair trade products in their
product range.
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